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Political Reforms and Public Policy: Evidence from
Agricultural and Food Policies
Alessandro Olper, Jan Fałkowski, and Johan Swinnen
This paper studies the effect of political regime transitions on public policy using a
new data set on global agricultural and food policies over a 50-year period (including
data from 74 developing and developed countries over the 1955–2005 period).
We find evidence that democratization leads to a reduction of agricultural taxation,
an increase in agricultural subsidization, or both. The empirical findings are consistent
with the predictions of the median voter model because political transitions occurred
primarily in countries with a majority of farmers. The results are robust to different
specifications, estimation approaches, and variable definitions. JEL codes: D72, F13,
O13, P16, Q18
Across the world, agricultural and food policies distort incentives for farmers
and food consumers. Historically, governments in wealthy countries have sub-
sidized farmers, whereas governments in poor countries have taxed farmers
and subsidized food consumers (Anderson and Hayami 1986; Krueger et al.
1988; Anderson 1995). These observations have puzzled economists and other
social scientists and triggered a series of studies in the 1980s and 1990s on
“the political economy of agricultural policies” (see de Gorter and Swinnen
2002; Swinnen 2010 for reviews).
A recent global study on policy distortions in agriculture concludes that al-
though policy distortions remain important, since the 1980s, the antiagricultural
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policy bias in developing countries and the proagricultural bias in high income
countries have declined substantially (Anderson 2009). Interestingly, this was
also the period during which important political reforms occurred in many
countries. For example, the fall of the Berlin wall triggered democratic transi-
tions across Eastern Europe in the early 1990s. Furthermore, several
developing and emerging countries have become more democratic in recent
decades. In Eastern Europe, political reforms induced radical economic liberali-
zations in the food system. In contrast, in the absence of major political
reforms in East Asia, gradual economic liberalization was introduced, including
the reduced taxation of farmers (Swinnen and Rozelle 2006).
Thus, the question arises whether and to what degree political reforms have
affected agricultural and food policies worldwide. Political economy studies
have demonstrated the importance of a variety of factors, such as economic
structural factors and resource endowments, but the role of political institu-
tions and reforms has received less attention. A few studies have attempted
to analyze this issue, but the evidence on the impact of political reforms on
agricultural and food policies is not clear because of problems with the data
(see section II for references and details).
This paper employs a novel data set on agricultural distortions that was
recently developed by the World Bank (see Anderson and Valenzuela 2008).
This data set offers consistent and comparable protection indices for a large
number of countries over a 50-year period. Employing this data set allows us
to take advantage of not only cross-country variation but also within-country
variation in the data and thus to overcome the strong identification assump-
tions that characterize previous cross-country studies.
Because the relationship between democracy and public policy may conceal
potential feedback effects, we also study the reverse causality problem and
exploit the timing of democratization. To control for potential nonlinearities
and to better address unobserved heterogeneities, we estimate both linear speci-
fications and semiparametric models. Specifically, we study the effects of demo-
cratic reform using the difference-in-difference (D-in-D) technique combined
with propensity score matching methods, as in Persson and Tabellini (2008).
By studying agricultural and food policies, our analysis contributes to a
broad body of literature on the impact of political reforms on economic poli-
cies (see Rodrik and Wacziarg 2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Eichengreen
and Leblang 2008).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I presents styl-
ized facts on trends in agricultural and food policies over time and across polit-
ical regimes. Section II discusses conceptual issues and summarizes previous
findings linking political reforms to public policies. Section III presents our em-
pirical strategy. Section IV presents the data and key variables. In section V,
the empirical results are presented and discussed, and in section VI, we test the
robustness of our findings. Finally, section VII concludes.
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I . P O L I C Y I N D I C A T O R S A N D S T Y L I Z E D F A C T S
We employ two different indicators of agricultural and food policies: the
nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to agriculture and the relative rate of assis-
tance (RRA), both from the World Bank’s agricultural distortions database (see
Anderson and Valenzuela 2008, for calculation details). This database reports
the most consistent and comparable estimates of agricultural protection across
countries and over time. In our econometric analysis, we use a sample of 74
countries, comprising yearly data from 1955 to 2005 (see table S.1 in the sup-
plemental appendix, available at http://wber.oxfordjournals.org/). The average
number of observations per country is 35. We work with an unbalanced panel
with more than 2,600 observations.
The NRA measures total transfers to agriculture as a percentage of the un-
distorted unit value. The NRA for agriculture is obtained as a weighted
average of the NRA at the product level, using the undistorted value of produc-
tion as a weight. The NRA is positive when agriculture is subsidized, negative
when it is taxed, and zero when net transfers are zero. The NRA includes both
the assistance provided by all tariff and nontariff trade measures applied to ag-
ricultural products and any domestic price-distorting measures.1 The price
equivalent of any direct intervention regarding inputs or outputs is also
included.2
To account for the protection of manufacturing sectors, which is an impor-
tant source of indirect taxation on agriculture, especially in developing coun-
tries, we use both the NRA and the RRA, which is calculated as the ratio of
agricultural NRA to nonagricultural NRA.3 The RRA is a useful indicator for
international comparisons of anti- or proagricultural policy regimes. There are
fewer observations for the RRA because the country and time-series coverage is
smaller than for the NRA. Specifically, the RRA data contain five fewer coun-
tries (69 instead of 74).
Table 1 summarizes the NRA and RRA for democracies and autocracies (see
below for definitions). The table indicates that autocracies are associated with
negative levels for both NRA and RRA, whereas democracies have positive
levels. Moreover, the differences are significant. The average NRA (RRA) is
1. This includes implicit trade taxes related to government intervention on the domestic market for
foreign currency and support for public agricultural research (Anderson et al. 2009).
2. Note that the heterogeneous nature of agricultural protection in both developing and developed
countries may cause an aggregation bias in measures such as the NRA (see Aksoy 2005). To attenuate
this potential aggregation bias, in the empirical analysis presented below, we also work with data at the
commodity level.
3. Specifically, RRA ¼ 100[(1 þ NRAag/100)/(1 þ NRAnonag/100)2 1], where NRAag is the
nominal assistance to agriculture, and NRAnonag is the nominal assistance to nonagricultural sectors.
Note that because of the computational complexity of this index, the NRA to nonagricultural sectors is
only based on distortion owing to tariff protection at the border.
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20.15 (20.26) for autocracies and þ0.45 (þ0.31) for democracies, a diffe-
rence of 0.60 (0.57) or 60 (57) percentage points.
Although these statistics demonstrate that the average NRA and RRA values
are much higher in democracies than in autocracies, they say nothing about the
potential causal effect of democratization on agricultural policies. To obtain
further insight on this issue, we examine the NRA and RRA values of countries
in the data set that have experienced a political transition from autocracy to
democracy. Specifically, figures 1 and 2 present the average NRA and RRA
values in the predemocratization and postdemocratization periods for 23 coun-
tries that have experienced permanent democratization, as defined by
Papaiannou and Siourounis (2008).4
The figures reveal interesting patterns. First, both the average NRA and
RRA values are relatively stable during the decade prior to a democratic transi-
tion, approximately 25 percent for NRA and approximately 213 percent for
RRA. Second, the average NRA and RRA values are significantly higher fol-
lowing democratic reform. The average NRA in the decade after democratiza-
tion is 13 percent, or 18 percent higher than in the decade before
democratization. For the RRA, the increase is 16 percent (from 213 percent
to þ3 percent). Third, the figures suggest that there is both an immediate effect
TA B L E 1. NRA and RRA over Time and across Political Regimes
Full sample Autocracy Democracy
NRA RRA NRA RRA NRA RRA
1956–1959 0.41 0.18 20.13 20.29 0.66 0.41
1960–1964 0.28 0.08 20.16 20.30 0.54 0.30
1965–1969 0.27 0.07 20.13 20.27 0.51 0.27
1970–1974 0.10 20.01 20.24 20.33 0.46 0.26
1975–1979 0.10 0.02 20.23 20.31 0.44 0.31
1980–1984 0.09 0.03 20.22 20.29 0.38 0.28
1985–1989 0.29 0.20 20.06 20.22 0.59 0.47
1990–1994 0.23 0.18 20.14 20.23 0.41 0.37
1995–1999 0.19 0.15 20.13 20.19 0.28 0.23
2000–2005 0.20 0.16 20.08 20.20 0.26 0.21
All years 0.21 0.11 2 0.15 2 0.26 0.45 0.31
No. of countries 74 69 38 34 67 64
Notes: The figures report NRA and RRA averages for the full sample, autocracies, and democ-
racies in different subperiods. The number of countries refers to the total number in each category
in the 1955–2005 period and changes over time due to entry and exit.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
4. See section III for more detail on the definition and measures of “democratization.” Depending
on the time period covered and the year of democratization, the average at each point in time in figures
1 and 2 is based on different samples of countries.
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at about the time of democratization and an additional increase approximately
five years later.
In summary, these descriptive statistics indicate interesting correlations
between agricultural policies and political regimes, both across countries and
over time. In the remainder of this paper, we use econometric methods to
analyze whether there is a causal relationship.
I I . C O N C E P T U A L I S S U E S A N D L I T E R A T U R E
There is a substantial body of literature on how political reforms influence gov-
ernment policies (Mulligan et al. 2004). However, theory does not provide a
simple prediction of how democratic reforms affect agricultural protection.
In democracies, the distribution of political power is typically more equal than
the distributions of income and wealth. Consequently, median voter models
predict that democracies tend to redistribute from the rich to the poor, and this
effect is stronger with greater income inequality because the middle class has a
greater incentive to form coalitions with the poor (Alesina and Rodrik 1994;
Persson and Tabellini 1994). Similarly, democratic regimes may lead to
FIGURE 1. Average NRA and the Timing of Political Reforms
Source: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank’s agricultural distortions
database and the Polity IV database.
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economic policy reforms if these reforms create more winners than losers
(Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005).
Empirical studies have attempted to test this prediction using data on
democracy and economic liberalization. An area that has attracted substantial
interest is trade policy. Overall, the existing literature suggests a positive impact
of democracy on economic (trade) liberalization (e.g., Banerji and Ghanem
1997; Milner and Kubota 2005; Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Eichengreen and
Leblang 2008; Giuliano et al. 2011). Some studies, however, have argued that
this effect is not generally true but depends on a country’s resource endowment
(e.g., O’Rourke and Taylor 2007; Kono 2006).
There are several methodological critiques of these studies, such as the
problem of spurious correlation between democracy and economic reforms
(Eichengreen and Leblang 2008) or the existence of potential feedback effects
(Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Milner and Mukherjee 2009). An additional
problem is that most existing studies have examined the relationship between
democracy and trade policy using aggregate trade indices, such as the trade to
GDP ratio or the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness index (e.g., Giavazzi
and Tabellini 2005; Milner and Kubota 2005; Persson 2005; Eichengreen
and Leblang 2008; Tavares 2007). Studies have only rarely employed direct
indicators of trade policy, such as tariffs. Moreover, aggregated trade policy
FIGURE 2. Average RRA and the Timing of Political Reforms
Source: Own calculations based on data from the World Bank’s agricultural distortions
database and the Polity IV database.
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indicators may be misleading because different (and possibly offsetting) effects
may occur at a disaggregated level (Anderson and Martin 2006). Thus, an ex-
amination of disaggregated policies, such as agricultural and food policies,
could yield additional insights.
Empirical studies have estimated the impact of political institutions on agri-
cultural policies. Lindert (1991) was the first to document a positive impact of
democracy on agricultural protection. Beghin and Kherallah (1994) examine
the impact of different political systems (no-party, one-party, dominant party,
and multiparty systems) on agricultural protection. They find that political
institutions are important and that their effect is nonmonotonic: protection
peaks with dominant party systems and then becomes nonincreasing despite
further democratization. A nonmonotonic relationship between democracy and
protection is also found by Swinnen et al. (2000), who uses the Gastil index of
political rights. Specifically, they demonstrate that moving from low to medium
levels of political rights reduces protection, but any further increase in democ-
ratization does not necessarily result in substantial effects on agricultural pro-
tection. However, this nonlinear behavior runs in the opposite direction of that
found by Beghin and Kherallah. Olper (2001) finds that the level of democracy
per se does not seem to matter, but the quality of institutions that protect and
enforce property rights is important.
Although these studies highlight a number of interesting aspects, they should
be interpreted with caution. The studies all have potential problems of reverse
causality and omitted variable bias because they rely predominantly on the
between-country variation in the data. Their data sets do not allow for the ex-
ploitation of time series variation. To date, the only study to investigate the re-
lationship between democracy and agricultural protection by employing a long
time series is the study by Swinnen et al. (2001), which examines agricultural
protection patterns in Belgium between 1877 and 1990 and uses detailed indi-
cators of political reforms. Their paper demonstrates that only those political
reforms that generate a significant shift in the political balance toward agricul-
tural interests (e.g., the extension of voting rights to small farmers in the early
20th century) induce an increase in agricultural protection. This result provides
a logical interpretation of the democracy-protection nonlinearity discussed
above and highlights the importance of drawing inferences from autocratic-
democratic regime changes to improve understanding of the impact of democ-
ratization on agricultural protection.
An additional problem is that the absence of representative information on
the preferences of autocratic rulers complicates predictions of the effect of
democratization. The insulation of decision makers means that they can follow
their private preferences to a large extent when selecting policies. However,
this argument has little predictive power in the absence of information on auto-
crats’ preferences. The preference of rulers is a key variable, but there are
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major data and measurement problems. For example, quantitative data exist on
ideologies, but these data are limited to democracies.5,6
Assuming that rulers’ preferences are randomly distributed,7 the median
voter model predicts that the impact of democratization is conditional on the
structure of the economy. The share of farmers (or the rural population) in the
economy differs significantly between rich and poor countries. The factors that
make it difficult for farmers to organize politically in poor countries (such as
their large number and substantial geographic dispersion; see Olson 1965)
render them potentially powerful in electoral settings because they represent a
large share of the votes (Bates and Block 2010; Varshney 1995). Therefore,
ceteris paribus, one would expect that democratization is more likely to benefit
farmers in poor countries.
In our data set, the vast majority of transitions from autocracy to democracy
occur in poorer countries with a large number of farmers.8 In fact, the average
share of agriculture in total employment at the time of political transition is 65
percent, whereas the average share for all countries and time periods in the
data set is 25 percent. This finding implies that the measured effect of
5. Olper’s (2007) study of a cross-section of countries found that, on average, right-wing
governments are more protectionist with respect to agriculture than left-wing governments. Furthermore,
although left-wing governments support agriculture to a lesser extent, they tend to support farmers more
in unequal societies. This finding is consistent with qualitative evidence from Bates (1983), who argues
that socialist rulers in Africa tax farmers (by imposing low commodity prices), and from Tracy (1989),
who found that right-wing governments in Europe (such as those dominated by Catholic and conservative
parties) tend to support farm interests and protectionism.
6. There are other problems in empirically assessing the impact of rulers’ preferences. First, applying
a simple left-wing/right-wing model to agricultural policy is not straightforward because increases to
food costs through agricultural protection hurts both urban workers (left-wing interests) and industrial
capitalists (right-wing interests). Thus, rulers who support either labor or capital should oppose
agricultural protection, as they did historically in Europe (Kindleberger 1975; Schonhardt-Bailey 1998;
Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). Second, economic development may change rulers’ preferences. As their
economies developed, Communist autocracies shifted from taxing to subsidizing agriculture, as was the
case in democracies. Communist dictators of poor countries, such as Stalin in Russia, Mao in China,
and Hoxha in Albania, heavily taxed agriculture. However, farmers were subsidized at higher incomes,
such as in the Soviet Union under Brezhnev and in most Eastern European Communist countries in the
1970s and 1980s (Swinnen and Rozelle 2009). Third, rulers’ preferences are not restricted to ideology;
they may also reflect regional interests. Bates and Block (2010) show that the regional backgrounds of
leaders in Africa significantly affected their policy preferences. Leaders who drew political support from
cities and semiarid regions (as in Tanzania and Ghana) seized a major portion of revenues generated by
the export of cash crops (coffee and cocoa), whereas in countries where leaders came from regions
where cash crops were important sources of income (such as in Kenya and Ivory Coast), they imposed
few taxes on coffee and cocoa exports.
7. Olper (2007) finds more variation in policy choices, ceteris paribus, under dictatorial regimes
than under democracies. This result is consistent with the argument that dictatorial leaders are less
constrained in setting policies and that government responses to pressure from interest groups are
stronger in democracies.
8. Of the 42 democratic transitions (see table S.1 and the discussion below) included in the data set,
only five occurred in countries that are currently members of the OECD (Spain, Portugal, Mexico,
South Korea, and Turkey), and these transitions occurred at times when they had considerably lower
incomes than at present.
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democratization on agricultural policies in our data set should be in favor of
farmers (i.e., a positive impact on NRA and RRA) because of the structural
“bias” of political reforms. The move from autocracy to democracy primarily
occurs in countries where farmers constitute the majority of the population,
and the median voter model predicts that this situation should induce a pro-
farmer policy effect.
I I I . E M P I R I C A L M E T H O D O L O G Y
To address the problems of omitted variable bias and reverse causation in the
analysis of the effect of political institutions on policies and to make use of
both cross-country variations and time variations in the data, we use a D-in-D
strategy, as in recent studies (e.g., Giavazzi and Tabellini 2005; Rodrik and
Wacziarg 2005). To analyze the robustness of our results, we combine the stan-
dard D-in-D approach with semiparametric matching methods, as in Blundell
et al. (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2008).
Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), we define regime changes as a
“treatment” experienced by some countries but not by others. Then, we esti-
mate the effect of the treatment through a D-in-D regression. In this way, we
are able to exploit both the time series and cross-sectional variation in
the data. We refer to countries that experience a regime change in the observed
period as treated countries and to countries that do not experience a regime
change as control countries. In the regressions, we compare agricultural poli-
cies in the treated countries before and after the treatment with agricultural
policies in the control countries over the same period.
More formally, we run panel regressions9 with the following specification:
yit ¼ bDit þ rXit þ ai þ ut þ 1itð1Þ
where yit denotes our measure of interest, namely, agricultural policies mea-
sured by NRA and RRA; ai and ut are country and year fixed effects, respec-
tively; Xit is a set of control variables; and Dit is a dummy variable that takes
the value one for democracy and zero otherwise (see section IV). The parame-
ter b is the D-in-D estimate of the regime change effect. It is obtained by com-
paring the average protection after a regime change, minus protection before
the transition in the treated countries, to the change in protection in the
control countries over the same period. Here, the control countries are those
that do not experience a transition into or out of democracy—that is, those
that have either Dit ¼ 1 or Dit ¼ 0 over the entire sample period.
Estimates obtained from the standard D-in-D procedure are based on several
restrictive assumptions (see Abadie 2005; Persson and Tabellini 2008). First, it
9. For a discussion of the relationships among various estimators in the context of panel data, see
Mundlak (1978) and Mundlak and Larson (1992).
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is assumed that, absent any regime change, the average growth in protection in
the treated countries should be the same as in the control countries.10 Second,
the estimates do not take into account the (potential) heterogeneity of regime
change effects on agricultural policies.11 Finally, the estimates may suffer from
omitted variable bias due to time-varying (country-specific) covariates correlat-
ed with both democracy and policies.
To address the latter problem, in addition to the traditional controls, we
include in our specifications several time-varying, country-specific variables.
Furthermore, given our specific concern for (omitted) time-varying factors, we
add continent-year interaction effects in some specifications. This process takes
into account that changes in agricultural policies may be due to general devel-
opments in geographical clusters. Finally, we check the robustness of our
results by running dynamic panel models.
To circumvent the heterogeneity of regime change effects, the existing litera-
ture interacts the political reform dummy with other characteristics of reforms,
such as specific electoral rules or forms of government implemented by the new
democracy (see Persson 2005; Olper and Raimondi Forthcoming). However,
the problem with this approach is that the potential interactions or nonlineari-
ties are too numerous compared with the regime transitions in the data.
Therefore, we use semiparametric methods to address these problems; that is,
we combine a D-in-D methodology with a propensity score matching method,
following the approach discussed by Smith and Todd (2005) and Abadie
(2005) and applied by Blundell et al. (2004) and Persson and Tabellini (2008).
This method has two main advantages over the standard D-in-D estimator.
First, it ensures that the pretreatment characteristics that are thought to deter-
mine the outcome variable are balanced between the treated and untreated
countries. Thus, this method relaxes the strong identifying restriction of the
standard approach (Abadie 2005). Second, it relaxes linearity assumptions by
allowing for heterogeneous impacts of democratic transitions on agricultural
policies.
Our matching cum D-in-D strategy is implemented in two steps. First, to
avoid confounding the effect of political regime transition with that of factors
that determine this shift and because we cannot observe what would have hap-
pened if a democratic country had remained an autocracy, an estimate of the
counterfactual is constructed. Conditional on the number of observable charac-
teristics, the probability of regime change is calculated for each country (i.e.,
the propensity score). Based on this estimate, the next step involves an evalua-
tion of the difference in the evolution of agricultural policies between countries
with and without a regime change. Because matching relies on comparing
10. This restriction is partially addressed by adding several covariates in the vector Xi,t, to increase
the similarity between treated and control countries.
11. See Ashenfelter (1978) and Ashenfelter and Card (1985) for a general discussion of this subject.
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countries with similar propensity score values, the inferences are not distorted
by counterfactuals that differ substantially from the treated observations.
The average estimated effect of regime transitions that we compute (the
so-called average treatment on treated, ATT) can be presented as follows:
ATT ¼ 1
I
X
i
ai 
X
j
wija
j
i
 
ð2Þ
where I stands for the number of treated observations within the common
support; ai is the difference between the average level of agricultural protection
before and after the transition in the treated country i; ai
j is the difference
between the average level of agricultural protection in the control country j
over the periods before and after the transition in the treated country with
which it is matched; and wij (wij. 0 and
P
j wij ¼ 1) are weights based on the
propensity score that depend on the matching estimator (Sianesi 2001). We use
Epanechnikov kernel and Gaussian kernel estimators (Fan 1992; Heckman
et al. 1998).
I V. P O L I T I C A L R E F O R M I N D I C A T O R S A N D C O N T R O L VA R I A B L E S
To study how a regime transition toward democracy affects agricultural and
food policies, we need data on democratization episodes. Unfortunately, al-
though various democracy data sets exist, none of these data sets provides a
specific coding of regime transitions. Therefore, we follow the same strategy as
recent studies that have investigated similar questions at the aggregate level by
relying on the Polity2 index from the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers
2007).12 The composite Polity2 index assigns a value ranging from 210 to
þ10 to each country and year, with higher values associated with better de-
mocracies on the basis of several institutional characteristics, such as the open-
ness of elections or constraints on the executive branch. Following Persson
(2005) and Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005), we code a country as “democratic”
in each year that the Polity2 index is strictly positive, setting a binary indicator
called democracy to one (zero otherwise). A reform into (or out of) democracy
occurs in a country-year when this democracy indicator switches from zero to
one (from one to zero).
A potential shortcoming of this definition of political reform is that being
near any particular divide may differ from being far from the divide.13 Indeed,
the threshold of zero for Polity2 corresponds to a generous definition of
12. Polity IV has a longer time series and therefore includes more usable political reforms than
other existing democracy indices. For example, in addition to its shortcomings due to classification bias
(see Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008), the use of the Freedom House data strongly limits the number
of usable transitions because the information only begins in 1972. For a critical discussion of democracy
indices, see Munck and Verkuilen (2002).
13. We thank an anonymous referee for focusing our attention on this issue.
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democracy. However, as emphasized by Persson and Tabellini (2008) and
others, this definition has the important advantage that many large changes in
the Polity2 score are clustered around zero, an important property given our
identification strategy based on the within-country variation in the data.
Consequently, using a higher threshold for the definition of democracy has the
shortcoming of including very (small) gradual changes that are only poorly
related to significant regime changes in democratic transitions.14
Applying these criteria to our 74-country data set, we obtain 67 regime
changes, of which 42 are transitions into democracy and 25 are transitions into
autocracy (see table S.1). The distribution of these reforms is uniform over
time (53 percent before 1985) but not across continents: approximately 50
percent of the reforms are in Africa, 28 percent are in Asia, and 18 percent are
in Latin America.
To avoid the use of very brief reform episodes, we introduce the criterion
that the dependent variable must be observed for at least four years before and
after each regime transition. Under this rule, the effective number of reform ep-
isodes decreases to approximately 40. As a robustness check, we relax this cri-
terion to only two years of observable outcomes; this period includes nearly all
of the reform episodes reported in table S.1.
To check the robustness of our results, we use a distinct definition of regime
transitions. Specifically, we use the recently developed data set by Papaioannou
and Siourounis (2008) to define regime changes. These data are based on a
more complex procedure than that applied above. Specifically, to identify the
precise timing of each regime change, Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) rely
not only on the Polity2 index and the Freedom House democracy index but
also historical evidence derived from numerous political archives and election
databases. Using this procedure, the authors identify “full” or “partial” democ-
ratization episodes. However, because their analysis focuses solely on perma-
nent democratization, the use of their coding applies to a lower number of
transition episodes (23) in our data (see table S.1).
Control Variables
In the empirical specification, we include additional controls that are likely to
affect agricultural and food policies, as suggested by many previous studies
(e.g., Anderson 1995; Beghin and Kherallah 1994; Swinnen et al. 2000; Olper
2007). Specifically, our basic D-in-D specification always includes the following
structural controls: the level of development, measured by the log of real per
capita GDP; the share of agricultural employment in total employment; the log
14. It is important to note that the use of the “continuous” Polity2 index, instead of a discrete
index, does not affect our qualitative conclusions; a higher Polity2 score increases the level of
agricultural protection. These additional results are not reported to conserve space, but they may be
obtained from the authors upon request.
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of agricultural land per capita; and the log of total population. All of these var-
iables are computed from World Bank (WDI), FAO, or national statistics.
We also test the robustness of our findings by controlling for several other
(macro) covariates, such as different indicators of (aggregate) openness, govern-
ment expenditures, and economic and political crises (wars and conflicts).
Openness indicators (the trade to GDP ratio and the Sachs and Warner (1995)
index) and government expenditures are obtained from Wacziarg and
Welch (2008)15 and the Penn World Table, respectively. War and conflict year
dummies are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Version
4-2008 (see Gleditsch et al. 2002).
For our matching strategy, we use a limited number of covariates that are
likely to influence both regime change and agricultural and food policies.
As discussed previously, a shift in agricultural policy may require political
reforms of sufficient size (Swinnen et al. 2001). Therefore, in our model, we
include a variable, initial polity2, that takes the value of our democracy index
at the beginning of the sample. This variable is included to take into account
that countries with Polity2 values close to zero are more likely to have a politi-
cal regime change.
To control for the fact that the sample period varies in length across coun-
tries and that the length of the sample may be correlated with the probability
of changes in the political regime, we include the variable length of sample
(measured in years). This variable is designed to account for the possibility that
democratization may require time to have an impact. Furthermore, to control
for the fact that changes in both agricultural policy and political regime may
be related to economic development, we include the variable relative gdp,
which measures each country’s per capita income at the beginning of the
sample relative to U.S. per capita income in the same year. Finally, to control
for the possibility that the change in political regime may be related to the oc-
currence of conflicts (both domestic and international), we include the variable
conflict years, which measures the share of conflict years over the total length
of the period for which policy data are available.
V. E S T I M A T I O N R E S U L T S
Table 2 reports D-in-D econometric results with the NRA and RRA as depen-
dent variables. Columns 1 and 5 report “unconditional” democracy effects by
adding only the level of development to the vector of covariates X to control
for the well-known positive correlations between per capita GDP and both
democracy and agricultural protection. In columns 2–4 and 6–8, we analyze
15. The Sachs and Warner index, based on the recent update by Wacziarg and Welch (2008), is
equal to one when a country is considered open and zero otherwise on the basis on the following
criteria: an aggregate tariff rate greater than 40 percent, a nontariff barrier covering more than 40
percent of trade, a black market exchange rate of less than 20 percent relative to the official exchange
rate, and a state monopoly in major exports.
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TA B L E 2. Effect of Democratic Reforms on Agricultural Protection
Estimation
D-in-D regressions
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable NRA NRA NRA NRA RRA RRA RRA RRA
Democratic reform 18.560 16.272 13.997 13.274 13.183 11.206 9.506 10.378
(.001) (.001) (.003) (.005) (.006) (.016) (.036) (.016)
Log GDP per capita 32.919 48.717 42.461 45.935 34.518 39.014 35.076 41.540
(.011) (.000) (.002) (.001) (.004) (.008) (.005) (.000)
Employment share 288.857 294.180 261.086 265.281
(.107) (.082) (.324) (.276)
Land per capita 22.392 22.484 21.180 21.292
(.097) (.125) (.371) (.348)
Log population 228.825 232.349 23.249 216.952
(.410) (.340) (.931) (.622)
Trade policy reform (Sachs-Warner)
(.002) (.000)
Trade openness 20.065 20.053
(.278) (.390)
Government consumption 20.213 0.616
(.583) (.176)
Treatment All All All All All All All All
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental trends No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Countries 74 74 74 72 69 69 69 67
Observations 2,664 2,664 2,565 2,502 2,394 2,394 2,314 2,253
R2 (within) 0.184 0.323 0.338 0.359 0.230 0.339 0.351 0.387
Notes: p values based on clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses. Year and country fixed effects as well as interaction effects
between continents (Africa, Asia, and Latin America) and year dummies are included as indicated. The democracy variable is based on the Polity2 index
(see text).
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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the democratization effect using regressions controlling for both the standard
determinants of agricultural protection and macroeconomic and trade policy.
In all regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the country level, allow-
ing for arbitrary, country-specific serial correlation (see Bertrand et al. 2004).16
Because the fixed effects and other covariates are correlated, we only report the
fixed effects results (Mundlak 1978; Mundlak and Larson 1992).17
All specifications yield positive estimates of the democracy coefficient. The
significance varies between the 1 percent and 5 percent levels. The magnitude
of the democracy variable in column 1 suggests that a transition from autocra-
cy to democracy induces a strong effect: the NRA increases, on average, by
18.6 percentage points. In column 2, we add a set of continent-year interaction
effects to control for both differences in regional protection dynamics and the
nonstationary nature of the democracy dummy.18 Although their inclusion
slightly reduces the democracy coefficient, it remains significant at the 1
percent level. Columns 3 and 4 test the robustness of our findings by including
a set of covariates normally found to be significant determinants of agricultural
protection (in column 3) and the share of government consumption expendi-
tures in GDP19 and two different openness variables: the trade to GDP ratio
and a trade policy reform index based on Sachs and Warner (1995) (in column
4). The democracy effect is still estimated with strong precision (p, .01). The
magnitude of the estimated effect is very similar in both equations and slightly
lower than in columns 1–2. The effect on NRA is now approximately 14 per-
centage points. These results suggest that the positive effect of a regime change
on the NRA is very robust. The estimated coefficients of the other variables are
consistent with expectations from the agricultural protection literature.20
16. An alternative means of correcting for the potential problem of inconsistent standard errors
would be to follow a residual-aggregation procedure, as suggested by Bertrand et al. (2004). In our case,
where we consider approximately 40 reform episodes, this could be problematic because the power of
this procedure is quite low and diminishes rapidly with sample size.
17. Hausman tests also confirm this correlation. Please note that in the random effects model the
key result (i.e., the effect of democratization on the NRA and RRA) is positive and strongly significant
and is virtually identical in magnitude to the results reported in table 2 (additional results are available
upon request).
18. As emphasized by Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008), the democracy indicator behaves as a
trend because countries that switch to democracy seldom revert to autocracy.
19. We use total government consumption instead of government spending owing to data
limitations. For our broad country sample and the 1955–2005 time period, this is the most widely
available measure of government spending.
20. See de Gorter and Swinnen (2002) for a survey. A positive impact of GDP per capita is in line
with the so-called development paradox. A negative impact of agricultural employment is in line with
Olson’s (small) interest group story and the reduced per capita tax costs of subsidizing a declining
sector. A negative impact of land per capita is in accordance with the notion that countries with a
comparative advantage in agriculture are less protected (Anderson 1995; Swinnen 1994). Moreover, this
variable may capture collective action problems due to the heterogeneity of the farm group. This latter
interpretation draws on the observation that countries with more abundant land tend to consistently
have a more unequal distribution of land (Olper 2007).
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Columns 5–8 are analogous using the RRA as the dependent variable. The
results are similar, but the sizes of the effects and the precision of the estimates
are somewhat smaller. The magnitude of the estimated effect of reforms into
democracy on the RRA is 10–13 percentage points, depending on the model.
The small difference (4 percentage points) between the NRA and RRA regres-
sions suggests that the bulk of the democracy effect comes from changes in ag-
ricultural policies.21
An interesting hypothetical question is what the level of agricultural protec-
tion would be if all countries were democracies.22 In our sample, autocracies
are only present in Africa and Asia at the end of the data period. The issue is
most relevant for Africa because 10 out of 22 countries were still autocracies,
whereas only 3 out of 11 were still autocracies in Asia. A simple prediction
based on average effects (an increase from 14 percent to 18 percent for NRA)
and the use of 2000 as the base year (the year for which we have the largest
recent country sample) yields the following: with an average NRA of 215
percent in Africa in 2000, ceteris paribus, a hypothetical democratization wave
would induce a reduction in the average level of taxation of 6 to 8 percentage
points, resulting in an average NRA of 27 percent to 29 percent and effective-
ly halving agricultural taxation. In Asia, the average effect of hypothetical
democratization is smaller because fewer autocracies remain. The effect
depends on whether a simple average or a weighted average is used; China is
one of three remaining autocracies in the data set. The simple average effect on
NRA is an increase of between 4 and 5 percentage points for Asia, whereas the
population weighted average protection effect is an increase of 7 to 9 percent-
age points (from a weighted average NRA of approximately 9 percent).
V I . E X T E N S I O N S A N D R O B U S T N E S S C H E C K S
To further test whether our results capture a causal effect of democratization
on agricultural policies, we run several extensions of the model and robustness
checks. Specifically, in this section, we analyze how the results are affected by
considering or using (a) disaggregated commodities, (b) different indicators to
capture the timing of political reforms, (c) alternative estimation models
(matching, dynamic panels, feedback effects), (d) alternative definitions of
regime changes, and (e) additional indicators of economic and political crises.
For brevity, some of these additional regression results are reported in the sup-
plemental appendix.
21. This is consistent with the fact that running a regression using the nominal rate of assistance to
nonagricultural products, NRAnonag (i.e., the denominator of the RRA), as the dependent variable
means that the democracy reform dummy is never significant, irrespective of specification. These
additional results are available from the authors upon request.
22. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
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Disaggregated Commodities
The results reported in table 2 are based on an aggregated measure of protec-
tion. However, various sectors are taxed and subsidized differently for a
number of reasons, including differences in demand and supply conditions and
because these sectors are characterized by different market structures (e.g.,
small vs. large farms), which influences rent-seeking behavior. The heteroge-
neous nature of agricultural protection may also cause an aggregation bias in
measures such as the NRA (see Aksoy 2005). To investigate potential heteroge-
neity in the political reform effects across different groups of commodities,
table 3 reports regression results by separating importing and exporting sectors
(columns 1 and 2) and four commodity groups (columns 3–7).23
The disaggregated regressions demonstrate that democratization increases
the NRA for all subsectors, but the magnitude of the estimated effect differs: it
is higher (approximately 17.4 percentage points) for import-competing sectors
than for exporting sectors (6.8 percentage points). Similarly, the democratiza-
tion effect is positive for the four different product groups, but it is much
higher for grains and tubers (17 percent) and oilseeds (31 percent) than for
livestock products (5 percent) and tropical crops (7 percent).
Timing of Political Reforms
A potential shortcoming of our findings is that we have constrained the democ-
ratization effect to be monotonic (Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008).
Relaxing this assumption could yield additional insights into the dynamics of
this effect. Following Giavazzi and Tabellini (2005) and Wacziarg and Welch
(2008), we investigate these issues by studying the timing of the reform effects.
To do so, we replace the variable democracy with three nonoverlapping
dummies: a dummy equal to one in the three years preceding the regime
change (3 years before), a dummy equal to one in the year of the reform and
in the three following years (years 0–3), and a dummy equal to one from
the fourth year after the regime change and onward (years 4 and after). The
3 years before dummy aims to account for potential positive changes in agricul-
tural protection before the democratic transition. For example, it is possible
that an autocratic government may implement protectionist policies to gain
legitimacy and remain in power.
Table 4 presents the results for the NRA and RRA. The estimated effect of
the 3 years before dummy is negative, except in column (2), but it is never sig-
nificant. This finding suggests that agricultural policies do not change prior to
democratization. Thus, our results do not support the hypothesis that the
23. The compositions of the groups are as follows: grains and tubers (e.g., rice, wheat, maize,
cassava, barley, sorghum, millet, and oats), oilseeds (e.g., soybean, groundnut, palm oil, rapeseed,
sunflower, and sesame), livestock products (e.g., pigment, milk, beef, poultry, egg, sheep meat, and
wool), and tropical crops (e.g., sugar, cotton, coconut, coffee, rubber, tea, and cocoa).
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anticipation of the democratization process is reflected in changes in agricultur-
al protection.
The estimated coefficient of the variable years 4 and after, which captures
the long-term effect of regime change, is positive and strongly significant for
both the NRA and RRA. The estimated values are similar to the values in
columns 4 and 8 of table 2. The results imply a long-run democratization
effect of approximately 16–19 percentage points for NRA and 13 percentage
points for RRA.24 For both the NRA and RRA, the short-term effect, captured
by the year 0–3 dummy, is always positive but is smaller in magnitude than
the long-term effect. For the RRA, in particular, the short-term effect is small
and not significant.
The results in table 4 are consistent with the descriptive evidence reported in
figures 1 and 2. After a democratization episode, there is an immediate increase
in agricultural protection. Then, policies appear to be stable for some years.
After a few years of democracy, we observe an additional increase in agricul-
tural protection. Thus, it appears that it takes time for democratization to fully
exert its influence on agricultural policy.
TA B L E 3. Effect of Democratic Reforms on Agricultural Protection
at the Sector Level
Estimation
D-in-D regressions
Products/sectors
Import
sectors
Export
sectors
Grains and
tubers
Livestock
products Oilseeds
Tropical
crops
(1) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA NRA
Democracy 17.4 6.8 17.4 5.1 31.0 7.1
(.007) (.026) (.000) (.632) (.050) (.367)
Treatment All All All All All All
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed
effects
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continental trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 (within) 0.239 0.146 0.228 0.279 0.391 0.424
Country-sectors 519 440 269 238 80 112
Observations 13,278 9,558 8,932 6,920 2,510 3,869
Notes: p values based on robust standard errors clustered at country-sectors in parentheses.
Additional controls include the log of per capita GDP, the log of population, agricultural employ-
ment share, land per capita, and product value shares. All regressions include time and country
fixed effects and interactions between years and continental dummies (for African, Asian, and
Latin American countries).
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
24. Not surprisingly, the magnitudes of these reform effects are similar to those in the regressions
that consider only permanent reforms. See the regressions in columns 3 and 6 in table S.5 in the
supplemental appendix.
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Matching
We now use a semiparametric analysis (i.e., a matching approach) to at least
partly relax the strong identifying assumptions in the D-in-D approach.25 The
results of the matching procedure are presented in table 5. Given that the esti-
mates are less efficient and less precise owing to fewer usable observations, the
matching results are consistent with the results obtained from the standard
D-in-D method. The effect of a transition to democracy is strongly positive and
statistically significant and is of the same order of magnitude. As in the D-in-D
regressions, the effect of democracy is larger on the NRA than on the RRA.
Dynamic Panel Methods
Next, we estimate the effect of democratization on protection using dynamic
panel models. Specifically, we employ a dynamic D-in-D regression to control
TA B L E 4. Timing of Political and Agricultural Policy Reforms
Estimation
D-in-D regressions
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable NRA NRA RRA RRA
3 years before democratic reform 21.371 0.954 25.505 24.100
(.640) (.744) (.047) (.145)
(.736) (.776) (.131) (.222)
years 0–3 after democratic reform 6.962 8.478 1.156 1.841
(.028) (.008) (.696) (.544)
(.191) (.067) (.775) (.637)
years 4 or more after democratic reform 16.360 19.455 13.629 13.675
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
(.019) (.004) (.032) (.034)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Continent-year dummies No Yes No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,565 2,565 2,314 2,314
Number of countries 74 74 69 69
R2 (within) 0.246 0.342 0.269 0.356
Notes: p values in parentheses based on robust and clustered standard errors, respectively.
Controls include log per capita GDP, employment share, land per capita, log of population, and
year and country fixed effects included in every regression.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
25. Table S.2 in the supplemental appendix presents the coefficients of the Probit models that were
used to calculate propensity scores. Although our model is not ideal for the prediction of shifts toward
democracy, the selected covariates provide some explanation for a regime change (pseudo R2 equal to
0.232 0.24). Table S.3 in the supplemental appendix compares the distribution of observed covariates
between the countries in the treatment and control groups. The matching performed well in terms of
removing significant differences between the treatment and control countries, although the treatment
and control groups were not particularly different prior to matching. Matching reduces the difference in
means for several variables, such as the dummy for Africa, relative GDP, and conflict years.
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TA B L E 5. Robustness Check: Matching Estimates of the Democratization Effect
NRA RRA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth in agric. Protection 14.63 13.95 9.72 9.25
Std. error lower bound (.062) .076) (.087) (.109)
Std. error upper bound (.070) (.085) (.107) (.152)
Estimation technique Matching Kernel
Epanechnikov
Matching Kernel
Gaussian
Matching Kernel
Epanechnikov
Matching Kernel
Gaussian
No. of treated countries 10 10 5 5
No. of control countries 10 10 7 7
No. of controls with repetitions 79 100 32 35
Notes: p values in parentheses. In the upper row, they are estimated assuming independent observations, whereas in the lower row, they are estimated
assuming perfect correlations of repeated observations in control countries.
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
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for the well-known persistence of agricultural protection. However, because
the lagged dependent variables in a fixed effects specification are mechanically
correlated with the error term for N. T, we also use a first difference
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (see Arellano and Bond
1991). The inclusion of a lagged protection variable on the right-hand side
may help to attenuate omitted variables bias because it captures accumulated
(unobserved) factors that affect actual protection.
To reduce bias due to the contemporaneous presence of both fixed effects
and the lagged dependent variable, we do not include countries for which
fewer than 20 years of data are available in the dynamic D-in-D regressions. In
addition, to render the regressions more comparable across dynamic estimators,
the dynamic D-in-D specification does not include the continental-year interac-
tion terms used in the static D-in-D regressions.26
The results of these additional regressions are reported in table 6. They are
consistent with our previous findings. The democratization dummies are
TA B L E 6. Robustness Check: Dynamic Panel Model of the Effect
of Democratization on Policy Reforms
Estimator D-in-D regression
with T. 20 years GMM difference
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable NRA RRA NRA RRA
Democratic reform 4.972 4.002 7.798 5.213
(.001) (.002) (.000) (.000)
Lagged NRA (RRA) 0.771 0.775 0.852 0.878
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Log per capita GDP 13.655 11.308 50.915 47.153
(.000) (.001) (.002) (.001)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of countries 61 55 74 68
Observations 2,364 2,151 2,439 2,194
R2 (within) 0.695 0.707
No. of GMM Instruments 52 52
Hansen test for over-id. (p value) .858 .920
AR2 test (p value) .279 .605
Notes: p values based on clustered standard errors in parentheses. Controls include log per
capita GDP, employment share, land per capita, log of population, and year fixed effects included
in every regression. GMM first difference based on xtabond2 in Stata, with instrument lag struc-
ture (2 4) and collapse option to control for instrument proliferation and using forward orthogo-
nal deviations instead of first differencing (see Arellano and Bover 1995).
Source: Own calculations based on the data described in the text.
26. Adding these continent-year interaction terms in the GMM equations induces a strong increase
in the number of instruments, rendering it difficult, if not impossible, to have fewer instruments than
groups and thus to respect the “rule of the thumb” when running GMM models (see Roodman 2009).
However, note that cross-country differences in protection dynamics are now largely subsumed in the
autoregressive coefficient.
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consistently estimated with strong precision (p, .01). As expected, the magni-
tudes of the estimated effects are lower than with the static model because we
are now capturing only the short-term effect of democratization on agricultural
protection. Moreover, the magnitudes of the democratization effects in the
GMM first-difference regressions are even higher than those using the
least-squares dynamic estimator.
Feedback Effects
To further assess the problem of potential simultaneity bias, we regress the
Polity2 democracy index on the level of protection in period t 2 1. Specifically,
we estimate the following democracy regression:
dit ¼ adit1 þ wNRAit1 þXit1bþ mt þ di þ 1itð3Þ
where dit is the Polity2 democracy index of country i in period t. The lagged
value of this variable on the right-hand side is included to capture the persis-
tence of democracy. The parameter NRAit21 is the lagged value of the protec-
tion level in agriculture. Other covariates are included in the vector Xit21. The
parameters mt and di denote full sets of year and country fixed effects, respec-
tively, and 1it is an error term capturing all other omitted factors.
For the same reason given above, the model in equation 3 is estimated using
D-in-D27 and first-difference GMM estimators. Moreover, because democracy
is a persistent variable, we run a system GMM regression (see Arellano and
Bover 1995). We find that the lagged protection coefficient is always insignifi-
cant in these additional regressions (see the results in table S.4 in the supple-
mental appendix). Thus, these results suggest that there is no feedback effect of
agricultural protection on the transition to democracy.
Definition of Regime Change
The evidence presented thus far has been obtained from approximately 40 po-
litical reform episodes based on the Polity2 index. We have checked whether
our results are driven by the specific definition of our political reform variable.
We have employed three alternative approaches: (a) defining a democracy vari-
able using all of the 67 reform episodes from Polity2; (b) using the data from
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2008) and including only 23 (permanent)
democratization episodes; and (c) only considering permanent transitions from
Polity2, namely, those that lasted at least eight years. These democratization
dummies differ in terms of not only the number of regime transitions consid-
ered but also the timing of the reform episodes (see table S.1).
27. We use a sample that excludes countries for which fewer than 20 years of data are available to
reduce bias resulting from the contemporaneous presence of both fixed effects and the lagged dependent
variable.
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The results are presented in table S.5 in the supplemental appendix. The
results remain robust using these different measures of democratic transitions.
Moreover, the additional regression results suggest that permanent transitions
are most important. In line with the dynamic results discussed above, tempo-
rary democratization episodes (i.e., in countries that revert to dictatorships
after a brief democratization episode) have a significantly lower effect on agri-
cultural protection.
Economic and Political Crises
As noted in the recent political economy literature, the implemented policies
may be related to both economic and political (in)stability (see North et al.
2009; Besley and Persson 2009 among others). Therefore, we complement our
earlier specifications with three variables designed to capture the effect of eco-
nomic and political crises. An economic crisis is measured with a dummy equal
to one for every year that the real GDP per capita growth rate from the Penn
World Table is negative (zero otherwise). A political crisis is measured with
two dummies equal to one in every year a country is involved in a domestic
war or international conflict (zero otherwise). All three variables are used in
the regressions with several lags.28 The effect of democratic reform on policy
outcomes is very robust to the inclusion of these additional covariates (see
table S.6).
V I I . C O N C L U S I O N S
In this paper, we investigate how democratization affects agricultural and food
policies. On the basis of the unique data set collected by the World Bank, we
empirically analyze the impact of political regime transitions on agricultural
taxation and subsidization.
We find a significant positive (negative) effect of a democratic transition on
agricultural protection (taxation). The transition to democracy increases agri-
cultural protection by 10 to 18 percentage points, depending on the indicator
and the model employed. This measured effect primarily reflects changes in
poor countries, where the vast majority of the transitions from autocracy to
democracy occurred and where farmers constitute a large share of the popula-
tion. In the data set we used, the average share of agriculture in total employ-
ment at the time of the transition from autocracy to democracy was 65 percent
(whereas the average share for all countries and time periods was 25 percent).
Our results are consistent with the predictions of the median voter model
suggesting that the impact of democratization is conditional on the structure of
28. As correctly noted by a referee, these variables can serve as imperfect proxies, at best, for shocks
in policy or world markets or variations in world prices. Nevertheless, they seem to be the best proxies
available. Note that by using a dynamic panel model, as in table 6, we implicitly account for potential
spurious correlations between democratization and protection due to (unobserved) policy shocks.
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the economy, which determines the share of votes of farmers among all voters.
The median voter model predicts that in poor countries where a large share of
the population is involved in farming, democratic reforms induce a profarmer
policy effect. The factors that make it difficult for farmers to organize political-
ly in poor countries (such as their large number and substantial geographic dis-
persion) render them potentially powerful in electoral settings. Thus, our
results suggest that democratization has benefited farmers in poor countries.
We also find that the short-term effects are smaller than the long-term
effects. The effect of democratization on agricultural policies is strongest four
to five years after a change in political regime. This finding suggests that time is
needed to arrive at a new equilibrium in economic and political institutions.
An important question related to an empirical analysis such as ours is
whether the relationship that we document is causal. We cannot rule out the
possibility of spurious correlation due to various shocks that may have oc-
curred over the past 50 years. We ran a number of extensions of the model and
robustness checks to account for this possibility to the greatest extent possible.
Our tests demonstrate that the results are robust to using different levels of
commodity aggregation, different indicators to capture the timing of political
reforms, alternative estimation methods, alternative definitions of regime
changes, and additional variables.
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